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{1}The Telecommunications Act of 1996 struck a bargain that allowed Bell Atlantic and the other Regional
Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") to gain entry into the long distance business by opening their
monopoly local exchange markets to meaningful competition. A key aspect of the market-opening process is
that the RBOCs, as well as generally all Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs") are required to
provide new Competitive Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs") access to the Operations Support Systems
("OSS"). The incumbents use OSS to serve their customers at quality levels equal to what the incumbent
provides to itself.
{2}This paper is intended to provide a general overview of what access to "OSS: really means, what is
involved in making it happen, progress thus far, and how regulators can ensure adequate OSS access going
forward."
I. THE INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS ARE OFFERING ACCESS TO THEIR
OPERATIONS SUPPORT SYSTEMS BECAUSE THE LAW SAYS THEY HAVE TO, NOT BECAUSE
THEY WANT TO
{3}To the RBOCs, OSS access is the castor oil they must stomach to get the long distance market capabilities
they want. Absent the lure of the long distance market, no RBOC would willingly give its competitors access
to the electronic systems and databases the RBOC uses to serve its customers.
{4}Those systems have reduced telecommunications unit costs substantially. The RBOCs and other
incumbent LECs are able to offer high quality service at a low cost by populating, processing, fulfilling, and
servicing customer orders through the use of electronically interconnected computers, systems, and
databases.
{5}For the new entrants to obtain parity with the incumbent when using its services or network elements to
provide local service, the new entrants need parity access to the incumbent's OSS. Recognizing this,
Congress mandated that ILECs offer new carriers nondiscriminatory access to the ILECs' OSS. The FCC has
spent the last four years working to implement that mandate.

A. Federal Statutory & Regulatory Requirements Mandating Non-Discriminatory Access to OSS
{6}The Telecommunications Act of 1996 obligates ILECs to provide CLECs with both the interconnection
with the local exchange carrier's network, as well as unbundled access to the ILEC's network elements under
terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.[1] The FCC first gave life to this
provision in its massive August 8, 1996, Local Competition Order,[2] where it is stated:
Much of the information maintained by these systems is critical to the ability of other carriers to
compete with incumbent LECs using unbundled network elements or resold services. Without
access to review, inter alia, available telephone numbers, service interval information, and
maintenance histories, competing carriers would operate at a significant disadvantage with
respect to the incumbent. Other information, such as the facilities and services assigned to a
particular customer, is necessary to a competing carrier's ability to provision and offer competing
services to incumbent LEC customers. Finally, if competing carriers are unable to perform the
functions of pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing for
network elements and resale services in substantially the same time and manner that an
incumbent can for itself, competing carriers will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded
altogether, from fairly competing. Thus providing nondiscriminatory access to these support
systems functions, which would include access to the information such systems contain, is vital to
creating opportunities for meaningful competition.[3]
The FCC has maintained this view of OSS access, most recently affirming it in its December 1999 decision to
allow Bell Atlantic - New York into the long distance market.[4]
{7}In a line of prior decisions rejecting RBOC requests to enter long distance, the FCC had defined what it
means for ILECs to provide CLECs with nondiscriminatory access to their OSS.[5] In those orders,
culminating with the recent New York order, the FCC has consistently stated that new entrants must have
access to the functions performed by the incumbent's OSS. These functions include populating and placing
orders for network elements or resale services, installing service to their customers, maintaining and repairing
network facilities, and billing customers.[6] The FCC has been constant in its view that, absent
nondiscriminatory access to the ILEC's OSS, a competing carrier "will be severely disadvantaged, if not
precluded altogether, from fairly cooperating" in the local exchange market.[7]
{8}As a result of these decisions, the meaning of "nondiscriminatory access" is important to RBOCs
requesting access to new markets. An ILEC "must provide access that sufficiently supports each of the three
modes of competitive entry envisioned by the 1996 Act - competitor-owned facilities, unbundled network
elements, and resale."[8] In addition, "for OSS functions that are analogous to those that an ILEC provides to
itself, its customers or its affiliates, the ILEC must offer requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms
of quality, accuracy, and timeliness."[9] The ILEC must provide access that permits competing carriers to
perform these functions in "substantially the same time and manner" as the ILEC:[10]
For example, we [the FCC] would not deem an incumbent LEC to be providing
nondiscriminatory access to OSS if limitations on the processing of information between the
interface and the back office systems prevented a competitor from performing a specific function
in substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent performs that function for itself.[11]
{9}For OSS functions with no retail analog, the FCC has held that "the BOC must offer access 'sufficient to
allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.'"[12] Here the FCC considers "whether
appropriate standards for measuring OSS performance have been adopted by the relevant state commission or
agreed upon by the BOC in an interconnection agreement or during the implementation of such an
agreement."[13] Assuming that there are such performance standards, the FCC then evaluates whether the

BOC's performance is sufficient to allow "an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete."[14]
{10}A simple example helps illustrate the need for OSS parity. Today, customers ordering new telephone
service typically can obtain the telephone number they will be assigned during the initial call with the ILEC
customer service representative. Similarly, ILEC customers generally can schedule a repair appointment in
the same conversation in which they report a service problem. Nondiscriminatory OSS access means that
CLECs engaged in resale or UNE competition must have the same ability to interface with the ILEC systems
in "real time," so that their customers can get the information just as quickly.
B. The FCC's Two-Step Process for Evaluating OSS
{11}The FCC uses a two-step approach to evaluate OSS nondiscrimination. First, the FCC determines, for
each of the five broad categories of OSS functions (pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and
repair, and billing) "whether the BOC has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient
access to each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing
carriers to understand how to implement and use all the OSS functions available to them."[15] Second, the
FCC assesses "whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed are operationally ready, as a practical
matter."[16]
{12}Under the first inquiry, the ILEC must demonstrate development of sufficient electronic and manual
interfaces to allow competing carriers equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS functions.[17] The ILEC
must give CLECs the specifications needed to design or modify their systems to enable CLECs to
communicate with the ILEC's systems and any relevant interfaces.[18] The ILEC must also disclose to
CLECs any internal business rules and other formatting information necessary to ensure that carriers' requests
and orders are processed efficiently.[19] Finally, an ILEC's OSS must be designed to accommodate both
current demand and projected demand for competing carriers' access to OSS function.[20]
{13}If those conditions are met, the FCC next examines "performance measurements and other evidence of
commercial readiness to ascertain whether the BOC's OSS is handling current demand and will be able to
handle reasonably foreseeable demand volumes."[21] It is important here to emphasize the FCC's belief that
"actual commercial usage" provides the best evidence as to whether OSS functions are operationally ready.
[22] Without commercial usage information, the FCC would be forced to rely on test results in assessing the
commercial readiness of an ILEC's OSS.[23] As experience has shown, however, testing alone may not be
sufficient to measure actual OSS readiness.
II. THIS OSS STUFF IS NOT EASY
{14}If the law seems complicated, the actual implementation is even more tangled. The term Operations
Support Systems has risen to a term of telecommunications art, used to describe the systems, procedures,
methods, requirements, and level of service that incumbent carriers use to establish and maintain services to
their CLEC wholesale customers. The range of activities swept under the "OSS" moniker is both expansive
and deep.
{15}The term OSS covers a multitude of functions the ILEC is required to make available: pre-ordering,
ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing. Each of these functions is an essential part of the
process of providing local exchange services to a customer. Each carrier, whether an ILEC or a CLEC, has
systems and procedures in place that support these functions.
{16}If customers are to order service from the CLEC and have it timely provisioned and properly maintained
and billed, the OSS of the ILEC and the OSS of the CLEC must be able to "talk" to each other with respect to
each of these basic functions. The trick - and it is not easy - is to develop and deploy automated interfaces

that offer fast, reliable, and seamless communication between the ILEC and the CLEC under all reasonably
foreseeable commercial circumstances. This assures that neither the ILEC nor the CLEC drops the ball and
causes customer inconvenience, or worse, actual service outages. If that communication is flawed for
whatever reason, then the service and the CLEC suffers because customers will blame the CLEC, even if the
problem is at the ILEC end of the relationship.
A. Pre-Ordering
{17}Before placing an order for a service, a CLEC must have access to certain pre-ordering information so
that it can actually place an order that is responsive to customers' demands. That information consists of the
customer's name, address, telephone number(s), services provided (for example, vertical features such as Call
Waiting), and the pre-subscribed interexchange carrier for both interLATA and intraLATA calling. Also, the
CLEC must be able to determine what features, functions and long distance carriers are available, to select
and reserve telephone numbers, to validate addresses and existing directory listing(s), and to establish a due
date for the fulfillment of the customer's order. Finally, the CLEC must be able to check the status of the order
at any time.
{18}The OSS interface to the multiple Bell Atlantic systems that support these functions can be either an
essentially manual web-based graphical user interface ("web-GUI") or an automated application-toapplication Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI"). The transaction first goes to a Bell Atlantic "gateway"
system (Bell Atlantic-South has four different ones for the pre-ordering functions, depending upon which
functions are involved) that then interacts with the appropriate back-end OSS to provide the necessary
information and functionality. Here again, to meet the requirements of the Act, the pre-ordering process for
CLEC representatives must be at parity with what is available to the Bell Atlantic representatives.
B. Ordering and Provisioning
{19}To place an order, the CLEC submits a Local Service Request ("LSR") or an Access Service Request
("ASR") to Bell Atlantic either through a web-GUI or an EDI interface. If the order flows through without
manual intervention (by no means a given), as AT&T and other CLECs have learned, it is processed by a
system Bell Atlantic calls the "Request Broker." It checks the completeness, formatting, and validity of
certain information, and rejects the LSRs or ASRs with errors back to the CLEC. If the LSR/ASR passes, it is
forwarded to other systems that perform further checks, generate a service order to provision the request, and
return a confirmation to the CLEC over the same interface used to submit the LSR/ASR. The provisioning
process requires the coordination of multiple tasks involving multiple Bell Atlantic back-end provisioning
systems. If an LSR/ASR does not flow through, it is sent to a Telecom Industry Services Operation Center
("TISOC") such as the one in Silver Spring, Maryland, for manual processing. The Bell Atlantic ordering and
provisioning OSS are also supposed to provide the CLEC with notice that the order has been completed and
allow the CLEC to check the status of a pending order electronically.
C. Maintenance and Repair
{20}CLEC access to the Bell Atlantic maintenance and repair systems is currently available only through a
web-GUI interface. For a high volume CLEC, this type of access is slow, difficult to administer, and
expensive. Hopefully, Bell Atlantic will soon be able to implement an acceptable application-to-application
interface (so-called "electronic bonding") that will facilitate volume transactions. The CLEC's point of
contact for maintenance and repair inquiries and requests is a Bell Atlantic system called the Repair Trouble
Administration System ("RETAS"). This system sends trouble inquiries and requests for service to various
back-end systems that perform testing and analysis and track maintenance and repair activities. RETAS also
return responses to the CLEC requests.

D. Billing
{21}The CLEC requires usage billing information to properly and accurately bill its customers. Bell Atlantic
provides this information using existing systems to deliver a daily usage file either electronically or on tape.
The principle Bell Atlantic systems supporting the billing functions are the Customer Record Information
System ("CRIS") and the Carrier Access Billing System ("CABS"). CRIS provides billing for retail and
resale services as well as some UNEs, such as unbundled loops. CABS provides billing for transport and
other wholesale functions, as well as other UNEs such as interoffice facilities and collocation.
{22}The ILEC's OSS must support each of the various services and functions CLECs may want to order.
Some CLECs may function as resellers of the ILECs' existing retail services. Some will want to purchase one
or more Unbundled Network Elements ("UNEs"), such as the local loop, or switching, or some other
functionality. Some will want a full combination of UNEs (the so-called UNE-Platform) that will enable the
CLEC to provide service using the same network elements that are in place for a customer today. Other
CLECs may want enhanced extended links (EELs) that combine the local loop with transport facilities that
enable a CLEC to serve customers over a broad geographic area using a centrally located switch. Still other
CLECs will want to engage in line sharing, where they provide data services on the higher frequency portion
of the local loop while the ILEC or another CLEC provides voice service on the lower frequency portion.
Given the market's natural tendency to innovate and differentiate, it is highly probable that CLECs will brew
their own interesting service mixes using the ILEC's various piece-parts coupled with some of their own. The
ILEC's OSS must be up to the task.
{23}An additional OSS complexity is that CLECs will want to submit their orders in various ways. Some
may be content to place manual orders (e.g., by faxing the order to the ILEC). Some may be content to place
orders through the equivalent of an e-mail ordering system, similar to what consumers use to purchase
products via the internet. In OSS parlance, this type of ordering is through the Web Graphical User Interface,
or Web GUI. Other CLECs, and certainly the larger ones, will submit orders through application-toapplication links they establish with the ILEC. Under this approach, the CLEC's ordering systems are linked
into the ILEC system so that orders and information flow electronically back and forth between the two
carriers without need for human intervention.
{24}Adequate OSS also requires that the CLECs understand what is required of them to interface with the
ILEC. This in itself is a multi-faced and complex proposition. To begin with, the ILEC needs to establish
systems, processes and other operational elements that will enable the CLECs to establish and maintain
business relationships with the ILECs. Has the ILEC published information sufficiently detailed to enable a
CLEC to understand what is required to do business with the ILEC? Does the ILEC provide adequate support
personnel to handle CLEC inquiries and problems? Has the ILEC implemented adequate change management
procedures so that updates to its systems and processes are communicated to the CLEC community
effectively and then implemented in an orderly, logical, business-friendly manner? Does the ILEC offer
adequate training to the CLECs on ILEC systems and procedures? Each of these must be present for a CLEC
to implement a relationship with the ILEC.
III. SO HOW DOES A REGULATOR GET THE ILECS TO PERFORM?
A. Testing, Monitoring, Measurements, and Penalties
{25}OSS provisioning is an unnatural act. Absent other incentives, no firm would want to provide its
competitors with the same access to its systems and customer information that it provides to itself. If left
unchecked, an ILEC will find ways to discriminate in favor of its own services. This means, simply, that it is
left to the regulators to ensure that ILECs step up to their OSS obligations. The tools at the regulators'

disposal are familiar ones: (1) testing to ensure that systems work as intended; (2) performance standards that
identify expected levels of ILEC OSS performance; (3) ongoing monitoring of OSS performance; and (4)
penalties for nonperformance. Each of these areas has been, and will continue to be, the topic of considerable
regulatory debate.
1. Testing
{26}It is now clear that an ILEC's OSS cannot be deemed compliant with the Telecommunications Act until
the ILEC passes an independent third party test. In states where Bell Atlantic serves, all such tests are being
performed by KPMG Peat Marwick. The extent of this testing is as broad as the OSS obligations themselves
and extends to every aspect of Bell Atlantic's OSS development and performance.
{27}The draft "Master Test Plan" currently under review in Virginia, for example, includes nineteen separate
tests of the procedures and processes Bell Atlantic uses to implement its OSS, and ten separate tests of the
manner in which Bell Atlantic handles OSS transactions. For "pre-order" functions, the test will examine
whether the CLECs are able to access Bell Atlantic's systems in order to (a) Obtain Customer Service
Records; (b) validate the customer's address; (c) reserve and release telephone numbers; (d) perform directory
listing inquiries; (e) inquire about feature and service availability; (f) determine if the customer's loop
qualifies for ISDN; (g) determine if the customer loop is xDSL capable; (h) determine whether Bell Atlantic
can meet the requested customer service use data; (i) inquire about the status of the customer installation; and
(j) inquire about the status of service orders.
{28}With regard to a typical UNE-P order, KPMG will test Bell Atlantic's systems to determine whether Bell
Atlantic's OSS can (1) migrate a customer from Bell Atlantic "as is;" (2) implement feature changes for an
existing customer; (3) migrate an existing customer and, at the same time, implement changes in the
customer's service package; (4) process an order for a new customer; (5) change a customer's telephone
number; (6) change a customer's directory listing; (7) add lines to a customer's existing service arrangement;
(8) suspend and restore a customer's service; (9) disconnect a customer's service; (10) process a customer's
move to a different location; (11) convert a line to ISDN; (12) move a customer from the CLEC to Bell
Atlantic; and (13) convert a customer arrangement from a resale arrangement to a UNE-P arrangement.
{29}In general terms, the transaction testing will occur in two phases. First, KPMG tests whether Bell
Atlantic's systems are able to process the transaction. If Bell Atlantic passes, KPMG will next test whether
Bell Atlantic is able to process the transaction at expected commercial volumes and, importantly, at peak (or
"stress") volumes, which would be up to 250% of normal volumes.
{30}This is only a broad overview of the scope and types of testing required to examine Bell Atlantic's OSS.
The full test parameters extend to all aspects of Bell Atlantic's OSS functions. The KPMG draft Master Test
Plan for Virginia is well over 100 pages and still is not quite complete in AT&T's view.
{31}The OSS testing is occurring in a highly dynamic environment. New regulatory decisions keep changing
the types and scope of services Bell Atlantic and the other ILECs must make available to competitors. These
new services must be added to the ILECs' OSS and, if not already included in an OSS test, must also be
added to the OSS test scenarios.
{32}Furthermore, the systems that ILECs are using to provide OSS are themselves subject to update and
modification, either because (hopefully) better systems become available, or because the old systems prove to
be inadequate to the task. As those changes occur, it is equally important that the new systems be subjected to
thorough testing as well. This is not always a trivial, or popular, matter. If, for example, a state commission is
well down the road to testing a system or process when a new one is implemented, the state may be reluctant
to retreat and undertake the additional work required to incorporate the new systems/processes in the test. It is

hard to imagine, however, any instance where it would be appropriate to test systems/processes that a state
knows will not be put to commercial use (or will be used only sparingly for a short duration) if the state is
serious about conducting a full-fledged OSS test.
2. Performance Standards
{33}In order for OSSs to be functional in the commercial environment, CLECs must be able to access the
ILECs OSS in the same manner - at parity - as the ILEC itself. Disparity in OSS access between the CLECs
and the ILEC's retail operations means that the ILEC has not met the requirements of the Act to provide
nondiscriminatory access to UNEs, interconnection and resold services to wholesale customers.
{34}The service quality metrics identify the data on OSS access that needs to be collected and quantified in
order to determine whether parity of access is achieved. The purpose of performance measurements and
standards is to provide the objective, empirical evidence necessary to permit the SCC and the CLECs to
determine: (1) whether the ILEC is providing parity of access to its services according to the Act; and (2)
whether the ILEC's performance is nondiscriminatory.
3. Penalties and Remedies
{35}The purpose of an effective remedies plan is to provide a meaningful deterrent to anti-competitive
behavior by the RBOC. The "carrot" of entering the long distance market is a powerful incentive, but once
the RBOC is in the long distance market it will have equally strong incentives to backslide on OSS
performance. Such discriminatory behavior would have a devastating impact on competitors and
competitions. Only a remedies plan with teeth will provide the necessary deterrent to anti-competitive
behavior.
{36}For a remedies plan to be effective, it must:
· Provide direct and unambiguous consequences for discriminatory performance by the ILEC;
· Provide dollar remedies that are self-executing and immediate;
· Be rooted in an established, comprehensive and verified performance measurement system;
· Have specific non-monetary consequences for chronic violations or backsliding (e.g., provision
for the new LD customers in the event that the ILEC's performance reaches a predetermined
threshold level of discrimination on certain key performance measurements).
4. Performance Monitoring
{37}Generally, regulators will monitor ILEC OSS performance in two ways. First, they will receive, review,
and, hopefully, probe the performance quality reports generated by the ILECs to ensure that the ILEC is
reporting accurately and that the report meets the regulator's requirements. Second, the regulator will be
asked to resolve CLEC complaints alleging poor OSS performance. It is vital to the development of
competition that these CLEC complaints be resolved quickly. CLECs, particularly the small ones, simply
cannot afford to engage in protracted regulatory battles over whether an ILEC is processing its orders as it
should.
IV. HOW ARE THINGS GOING SO FAR? IT DEPENDS ON WHOM YOU ASK . . .
{38}To date, the only experience with volume OSS transactions comes from New York. There, in late 1999,

the P.C. and FCC found the performance of Bell Atlantic's OSS adequate to allow Bell Atlantic to enter the
long distance market.
{39}This move was a bit premature. Almost immediately it became all too apparent that Bell Atlantic-New
York's OSS could not keep up with CLEC commercial demand. In December and January, AT&T had more
than 25,000 of its UNE-P orders lost in Bell Atlantic-New York's systems. AT&T had to open trouble tickets
with Bell Atlantic for over 40% of the orders AT&T placed in January. Even one dissatisfied customer is one
too many. AT&T had tens of thousands. Moreover, AT&T was not alone. Other carriers faced similar
problems.
{40}At this point, Bell Atlantic claims to have resolved the issue, but not before the New York P.C. directed
Bell Atlantic to credit ten million dollars ($10,000,000) to its CLEC customers and the FCC noted that Bell
Atlantic would be making a three million dollar ($3,000,000) "contribution" to the United States Treasury.
But as one CLEC representative noted, no amount of Bell Atlantic refunds can repair CLEC's damaged
relationship with customers whose orders were lost.
{41}The New York experience offers three regulatory lessons. First, it is important to test an RBOC's OSS
thoroughly with a military-style test conducted by an independent third party. Second, even a third party test
may not uncover all shortcomings in an ILEC's OSS. It is vitally important that, on the heels of a successful
third party test, a state commission establish a commercial availability period where New York type problems
can be unearthed and, hopefully, resolved before CLECs begin full-scale operations. Third, it is equally
important to implement strong performance measurements, backed by correspondingly strong penalties for
nonperformance, to ensure that the ILEC has adequate incentives to meet its OSS obligations.
V. CONCLUSION: THE VIRGINIA COMMISSION IS ON THE RIGHT PATH
{42}The Virginia Commission is to be commended for its approach to OSS testing. It has retained KPMG to
conduct a thorough, military-style test of Bell Atlantic - Virginia's OSS. It has appointed an administrator to
oversee the testing process from start to finish. It has made clear that Bell Atlantic will not be given a "pass"
until the Commission is satisfied that Bell Atlantic's OSS performs as advertised.
{43}There are still plenty of land mines out there, but Virginia has not hit any so far. . .
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general proposition, specific performance standards adopted by a state commission in an arbitration decision
would be more persuasive evidence of commercial reasonableness than a standard unilaterally adopted by the
BOC outside of its interconnection agreement." Id.
[14]. Id.
[15]. Id. (citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)). See also Second La. Order, 13
F.C.C.R. at 20654; S.C. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at 592-93.
[16]. Id. (citing Second La. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599 (1998), S.C. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997), Ameritech
Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)).
[17]. BA-NY 271 Approval Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 3953, 3992 (1999)(citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)). The ILEC must demonstrate that it has developed electronic interfaces for activities
which it performs electronically. Id.
[18]. See id. at 3992; see also Second La. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599, 20662 (1998); S.C. Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
539, 628 (1997); Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543, 20617 (1997).
[19]. See id. (citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)).
[20]. See id.(citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)). While the FCC as not required the
use of industry standards to meet CLEC needs, the FCC encourages it. See BA-NY 271 Approval Order, 15
F.C.C.R. 3953, 3993 (1999) (citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)).
[21]. See id. at 3993. See also S.C. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539, 593 (1997); Ameritech Michigan Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 20543, 20618 (1997).
[22]. See id. (citing Second L.A. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 20599 (1998), S.C. Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 539 (1997),
Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 20543 (1997)).
[23]. See id.
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